Introduction
This paper explores how the joint behavior of hiring and investment is gov- The answers to these questions are important for a number of key issues.
The evolution of employment and of the capital stock are essential for the understanding of macroeconomic ‡uctuations. It has been shown that gross hiring is a major factor for understanding employment and unemployment dynamics. 2 Hiring frictions were shown to play a key role in determining the business cycle properties of labor productivity (including its declining 1 This paper is dedicated to the memory of Dale Mortensen, a great inspiration, an academic leader and a much-beloved colleague. I thank Jordi Gali, Robert Hall, Gianluca Violante and, in particular, Giuseppe Moscarini for valuable comments and suggestions. I am gratfeul to conference participants at the NBER-RSW group, ESSIM-CEPR, Aarhus University-Sandbjerg, Sapir Forum Jerusalem conference and SaM-Edinburgh and to seminar audiences at Yale, LSE, Tel Aviv University, CREI, EUI, Bristol, Queen Mary, the Bank of England, Birbeck College and Keio for helpful comments on previous versions. I am indebted to Avihai Lifschitz and Ziv Usha for excellent research assistance. Any errors are my own.
2 See, for example, Hall (2007) and Rogerson and Shimer (2011) .
pro-cyclicality) and of the job …nding rate (including its high volatility). 3 Investment is key for the understanding of the evolution of the capital stock and consequently of …rm market value. 4 The results of this inquiry can explain the outward shift of the Beveridge curve and the big rise in unemployment in the Great Recession using changes in capital and job values. These …ndings have implications for business cycle modelling, such as the importance of incorporating joint investment and hiring costs, complete with the cited interaction, into DSGE models. The analysis takes into account the distinct, speci…c roles played by vacancy creation, gross hiring from non-employment, and job to job movements (as well as the separation ‡ows involved).
A major implication of the …ndings is that hiring and investment can be treated as forward-looking variables, re ‡ecting the expectations of future discounted pro…ts from employing labor and capital. Using the results of estimation, I employ a restricted VAR analysis, such as the one used in the asset pricing literature, to study this forward-looking aspect. The analysis shows how investment and hiring are related to their expected, future determinants, with future returns turning out to play the dominant role.
This approach naturally links up with stock prices that are also forwardlooking and relate to the same expected discounted future pro…ts. Indeed, in previous work, joint with Monika Merz (Merz and Yashiv (2007) ), we have shown that this set-up allows one to de…ne asset values for hiring and for investment and that these values can be used to explain the time variation of equity values of …rms in the U.S. economy. The current paper retains the focus on forward-looking behavior but does not make use of stock market data or tries to explain them. It updates the previous estimates, using a longer sample period, one that includes the Great Recession and its 3 Gali and van Rens (2014) show that a lower degree of hiring frictions may lower the cyclicality of labor productivity in ways which are consistent with actual U.S. aggregate data dynamics. Coles and Mortensen (2013a,b) study the role of hiring costs in dynamic environments which generate a result whereby there is no Shimer "puzzle" and the job …nding rate volatility matches the data. 4 See, for example, Cochrane (2011) . 
Background Literature
The literature on hiring and on investment is very large. In what follows I allude to those papers that relate directly to the focus of this paper.
First is the literature on search and matching models, which feature dynamic, optimal vacancy decisions by …rms in the face of frictions; see Pissarides (2000), Yashiv (2007) , and Rogerson and Shimer (2011) for overviews and surveys. Recruiting costs and time lags are the expression of frictions in these models. The …rst order condition for optimal vacancy creation is a key ingredient and this is one of the two estimating equations examined
here. The …nding in this literature, as indicated above, is that gross hiring, subject to these frictions, is key in accounting for employment and unemployment dynamics. The model here features a generalization of the hiring problem and a wider concept of costs relative to what has been considered by these models.
The second strand of relevant literature includes investment models, mostly following the seminal contributions of Lucas and Prescott (1971) and of Tobin (1969) and Hayashi (1982) . These models have been studied extensively for over four decades. The idea in these models is that costs are key to the understanding of investment behavior. These models have encountered a lot of empirical di¢ culties and have engendered much debate (see, for example, the discussion in Chirinko (1993) and Smith (2008) ). Like search and matching models, much of this literature does not feature the other factor of production, namely labor. In the current paper I present results both from the "traditional"formulation of the investment costs model and from a formulation which allows for the interaction of investment costs and hiring costs.
It should also be noted that models of the business cycle (evidently) feature optimal hiring and investment decisions. Many of them do not feature frictions, though a large part of the RBC literature assumes lags in the installation of capital. The latest vintage of business cycle models, surveyed by Christiano, Trabandt and Walentin (2010), posits costs for investment but no frictions in hiring. Note, too, that in business cycle models there is no explicit interaction between hiring costs and investment costs.
A key issue in the current paper is the mutual dependence of hiring and investment and the interaction of their costs. This is not a new issue. Mortensen (1973) has examined the interrelation of costs in a theoretical model and over the years some empirical work was attempted; prominent examples include Nadiri and Rosen (1969), Shapiro (1986) , and Hall (2004) .
These studies point to the potential importance of including costs on both capital and labor. However key di¤erences with the current study are that these papers do not model at least one of three elements, which the empirical work below …nds to be of crucial importance: (i) an interaction term between the two costs; (ii) gross, as opposed to net, hiring ‡ows; and (iii) aggregate, as opposed to micro-level, hiring and investment. It should also be emphasized, that the current paper stays within the representative …rm framework of the cited literature and does not at all attempt to go into a …rm-level or sector-level analysis. Hence most of the …ndings of the latter type of studies may be di¤erent from what is reported here.
This paper stresses the forward-looking aspect of hiring and investment.
Consequently an important issue is the future determinants of current behavior. This issue is studied, for the case of stock prices, by a sizeable strand of literature in Finance, launched by the work of Campbell and Shiller (1988) .
A key concern in this literature has been the question of what is the relative importance of dividend growth and of future returns for stock price volatility. I make use of the methodology developed in this literature, examined by Cochrane (2011) , to determine the relative importance of the future determinants of current hiring and current investment. Recently, Hall (2014) has taken up this issue, albeit making use of a di¤erent empirical methodology.
The Model
I delineate a partial equilibrium model which serves as the basis for estimation. There are identical workers and identical …rms, who live forever and have rational expectations. All variables are expressed in terms of output.
Firms. Firms make gross investment (i t ) and vacancy (v t ) decisions.
Once a new worker is hired, the …rm pays him or her a per-period wage w t .
Firms use physical capital (k t ) and labor (n t ) as inputs in order to produce output goods y t according to a constant-returns-to-scale production function f with productivity shock z t :
Gross hiring and gross investment are subject to frictions, spelled out below, and hence are costly activities. I represent these costs by a function g[i t ; k t ; v t ; h t ; n t ] which is convex in the …rm's decision variables and exhibits constant returns-to-scale, allowing hiring costs and investment costs to interact.
In every period t, the capital stock depreciates at the rate t and is augmented by new investment i t . Similarly, workers separate at the rate t and the employment stock is augmented by new hires q t v t = h t : The laws of motion are:
The representative …rm chooses sequences of i t and v t in order to maximize its pro…ts as follows:
subject to the constraints (2) and (3), and where t is the corporate income tax rate, w t is the wage, t the investment tax credit, D t the present discounted value of capital depreciation allowances,p I t the real pre-tax price of investment goods, and t+j is a time-varying discount factor: The …rm takes the paths of the variables q t ; w t ; p I t ; t ; t ; t and t as given. This is consistent with the standard models in the search and matching and Tobin's q literatures. The Lagrange multipliers associated with these two constraints are Q K t+j and Q N t+j , respectively. These Lagrange multipliers can be interpreted as marginal q for physical capital, and marginal q for employment, respectively. I shall use the term capital value or present value of investment for the former and job value or present value of hiring for the latter.
The …rst-order conditions for dynamic optimality are: 5
I can summarize the …rm's …rst-order necessary conditions from equations (5)- (8) by the following two expressions:
(1 t )
Worker Flows. Consider worker ‡ows. The 10 ‡ow from non-employment -unemployment (U ) and out of the labor force (O) -to employment is to be denoted OE + U E and the separation rate t is rate of the ‡ow in the opposite direction, EU + EO. Worker ‡ows within employment -i.e., job to job ‡ows -are to be denoted EE:
I shall denote:
5 where I use the real after-tax price of investment goods, given by:
Hence h 1 and h 2 denote ‡ows from non-employment and from other employment, respectively. Separation rates are given by:
Equation (3) now satis…es:
Matching and Separations. 6 Firms hire from non-employment (h 1 t ) and from other …rms (h 2 t ). Each period, the worker's e¤ective units of labor (normally 1 per person) depreciate to 0, in the current …rm, with some exogenous probability t . Thus, the match su¤ers an irreversible idiosyncratic shock that makes it no longer viable. The worker may be reallocated to a new …rm where his/her productivity is (temporarily) restored to 1. This happens with a probability of 2 t : Those who are not reallocated join unemployment, with probability t that enters job to job ‡ows depends on the endogenous hiring ‡ow h 2 t . The …rm decides how many vacancies to open and, given job …lling rates (q 1 t ; q 2 t ), will get to hire from the pre-existing non-employed and from the pool of matches just gone sour. The matching rates satisfy: 6 I am indebted to Giuseppe Moscarini for very useful suggestions to this section.
Estimation
I estimate equations (9) and (10), using structural estimation and alternative versions of the model. In what follows I present the parameterization of the production and costs functions, the econometric methodology, the data and the estimation results.
Methodology
To estimate the model I need to parameterize the relevant functions. For the production function I use a standard Cobb-Douglas formulation, with productivity shock z t : f (z t; n t ; k t ) = e zt n t k
The costs function g; capturing the di¤erent frictions in the hiring and investment processes, is at the focus of the estimation work and merits dis- 
This function is linearly homogenous in its arguments i; k; v; h; n. The parameters e l , l = 1; 2; 31; 32 express scale, and the parameters 1 ; 2 ; 31 ; 32 express the convexity of the costs function with respect to its di¤erent arguments.
1 is the weight in the cost function assigned to hiring from non-employment ( 2 is the weight assigned to hiring from other …rms ( Arguments of the function. This speci…cation captures the idea that frictions or costs increase with the extent of the activity in question -vacancy creation, hiring and investment. This needs to be modelled relative to the size of the …rm. The intuition is that hiring 10 workers, for example, means di¤erent levels of hiring activity for …rms with 100 workers or for …rms with 10,000 workers. Hence …rm size, as measured by its physical capital stock or its level of employment, is taken into account and the costs function is increasing in the vacancy, hiring and investment rates, More speci…cally, the terms in the function presented above may be justi…ed as follows (drawing on Garibaldi and Moen (2009)): suppose each worker i makes a recruiting and training e¤ort h i ; as this is to be modelled as a convex function, it is optimal to spread out the e¤orts equally across workers so h i = h n ; formulating the costs as a function of these e¤orts and putting them in terms of output per worker one gets c h n f n ; as n workers do it then the aggregate cost function is given by c h n f: Convexity. I use a convex function, allowing for alternative speci…cations of the degree of convexity (quadratic, cubic) and looking also at a linear speci…cation. The use of such a function may be questioned at the microlevel, as non-convexities were found to be signi…cant at that level (plant, establishment, or …rm). But a number of recent papers have given empirical support to the use of a convex function in the aggregate, showing that such a formulation is appropriate at the macroeconomic level. 8 Interaction.. The terms In estimation, I explore these alternative speci…cations.
Estimation of the parameters in these functions allows for the quanti…-cation of the derivatives g it and g vt that appear in the …rms' optimality equations (9) and (10) . I structurally estimate the …rms'…rst-order conditions (9) and (10) 
The Data
The data are quarterly, pertain to the private sector of the U.S. economy.
For a large part of the empirical work reported below the sample period is 1994-2013. The start date of 1994 is due to the lack of availability of job to job worker ‡ows (h 2 t ) data prior to that. For another part of the empirical work, the sample covers 1976-2013 and the 1976 start is due to the availability of credible monthly CPS data from which the gross hiring ‡ows (h 1 t ) series is derived. This longer sample period covers …ve NBER-dated recessions, including the Great Recession of 2007-2009 and its aftermath (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) (2013) . The data include NIPA data on GDP and its de ‡ator, capital, investment, the price of investment goods and depreciation, BLS CPS data on employment and on worker ‡ows, and Fed data computations on tax and depreciation allowances. Appendix B elaborates on the sources and on data construction. These data have the following distinctive features: (i) they pertain to the U.S. private sector; (ii) both hiring h and investment i refer to gross ‡ows; likewise, separation of workers and depreciation of capital are gross ‡ows; (iii) the estimating equations take into account taxes and depreciation allowances. Table 1 presents key sample statistics. 
Implied Costs
The estimated costs are interesting and important by and of themselves, as many models rely on their existence. Hence, the results of Table 2 w ; so they indicate how much the …rm pays for vacancy creation and hiring in wage terms. Key moments are presented in Tables 3a   and 3b . follows, I will use both the terms vacancies (v t ) and hiring (h t ) and it should be kept in mind that h t = q t v t ; with the …rm taking q t as given.
Vacancy and Investment Rates as Functions of the Present Values
Taking equations (6)- (8), using the de…nitions of the derivatives of the g function spelled out in Appendix A, and the results of row 1 in 
where:
The estimates of Table 2 indicate that e 1 ; e 2 > 0; e 31 ; e 32 < 0 and and Q K t (net of p I t ), taking into account taxes. It is therefore apparent that models which ignore the present value of the other factor are mis-speci…ed, as e 31 6 = 0 and e 32 6 = 0. Table 4 shows the …rst and second moments of the decomposition of the RHS of the equations in (15)-(16).
Table 4
In both cases, the cross e¤ects are substantial. Of the mean quarterly vacancy rate of 2.8%, a fraction of 74% is due to the present value of hiring
. The variance of the vacancy rate (std of 0.5%) is decomposed in rows 2 and 3, which sum up to 1. The investment term plays a substantial role -its variance is bigger than that of the hiring term and the co-variance of the two terms is substantial. Hence the results imply that the present value of investment plays a substantial role in the determination of the volatility of hiring rates.
The mean quarterly investment rate of 2.6% is due to the present value of hiring term (53%) and the present value of investment term (47%). The variance of the investment rate (std of 0.2%) is decomposed into a smaller part due to the hiring term and a bigger part played by the variance of the investment term and a large (negative) co-variation with hiring. Hence investment is heavily in ‡uenced by hiring value both in terms of its mean value and in terms of its volatility.
Negative Interaction Engenders Simultaneity
In Table 2a , the estimates of the coe¢ cients of the interaction terms, e 31 ; e 32 are negative. These negative point estimates imply a negative value for g vi and, therefore, as can be seen in equations (15) The signs of these derivatives imply that for given levels of investment, total and marginal costs of investment decline as vacancies increase. Similarly, for given levels of vacancies, total and marginal costs of vacancies decline as investment increases. This …nding of complementarity between investment and vacancies/hiring is to be expected as it implies that they should be simultaneous. One interpretation of this result is that simultaneous hiring and investment is less costly than sequential hiring and investment of the same magnitude. This may be due to the fact that simultaneous action by the …rm is less disruptive to production than sequential action. Table 2a ). Figure 1a also shows the same value according to the Tobin's q model (row 1 in Table 2b ) and Figure 1b shows the same value according to the standard, search and matching model (row 3 in Table 2b ). NBER-dated recessions are shaded.
Capital and Job Values Across Models

Figures 1a and b
In terms of the …rst moment, as discussed in the preceding section and shown in Table 3b , both the Tobin's q model and the standard search and matching model estimates imply very high marginal costs (read on the right scale of the …gures). For the former, these are on average 10% of the purchase price of capital (p I ): For the latter they are equivalent to about 31 weeks of wages on average. 10 In the current model, as shown in Table 3a , they are 4% of the purchase price and equivalent to 4 weeks of wages, respectively. In 1 0 See Table 3b. terms of second moments, the Tobin's q estimates are correlated 0:37 with the preferred estimates here; the standard search and matching model costs are negatively correlated, at 0:57; with the values implied by the preferred speci…cation. The negative co-movement is highly apparent in the shaded recession periods.
The reasons for these substantial di¤erences are as follows. The Tobin's q model and the standard matching model ignore the interaction with the other factor (as they set e 31 = e 32 = 0). Moreover, the standard matching model postulates linear costs that pertain to vacancies only. Essentially it is (1 t)e2 qt and its main variation comes from q t ; the …rm matching rate, that appears in its denominator. The preferred speci…cation in the current model features convex costs that pertain to both investment ( it kt ) and hiring ( ht nt ) rates (both from non-employment and job to job ‡ows) as well as to vacancy rates. 11 Hence the di¤erent models take very di¤erent stands on the arguments of the investment and hiring frictions function and on its shape.
The cyclical implications of these di¤erences are further explored in Yashiv pricing literature in Finance and examine the present value relationships governing hiring and investment. This involves the use of a forecasting VAR.
The analysis is based on the framework proposed by Campbell and Shiller (1988) and its more recent elaboration by Cochrane (2011), whose notation I follow. 12 Note that I do not consider stock prices or any …nancial data here; rather, I apply the empirical framework developed in the cited Finance literature to the current context. The results in the Finance literature do, however, provide a natural benchmark against which to compare the current results. 13 
An Asset Pricing Model
The model begins with the following two-period representation for the stock price (P ) and dividends (D):
where R is the gross return. Iterated forward this yields:
These relationships hold true also ex-post if one de…nes the gross return as:
Using logs, this asset pricing relationship can be approximated as: 14 Equation (19) is an ex-ante formulation using conditional expectations.
The ex-post equation, omitting the expectations operator E t in the above, holds true as well, when using (18) .
The current price (p t ) is related to the future dividend (d t+1 ) and to the future return (r t+1 ). The price will be higher when the future dividend is higher and/or when the future return is lower.
Implementing the Forecasting Model for Hiring and Investment
I cast the estimated model of hiring and investment into this asset pricing framework by de…ning P and D for the optimal investment equation and for the optimal hiring equation. The "price"P is the value of capital or the value of jobs; this is essentially marginal q for capital investment (Q K ) and marginal q for labor hiring (Q N ), each divided by the relevant productivity Rather, they represent what the …rm actually gets from its use of capital and labor in production. Thus, the "dividend" in the investment case is the net marginal productivity of capital; in the hiring case it is net labor pro…tability, i.e., the net marginal product of labor less the wage. These "dividends" do not depend on institutional or …nancial considerations of …rms as dividends do in the Finance context. De…ne:
Comparing equation (20) to (18), one can see that two additional terms in the current context are the one involving capital depreciation ( t ) and one involving capital productivity growth (G and investment costs would be
captures the gross rate of growth of this productivity.
Appendix D shows that this formulation yields the following log-linear approximation for log capital values:
where small letters denote variables in logs and where k =
For labor, de…ne:
Comparing equation (22) to (18) 
where n =
Empirical Methodology
I use a restricted VAR to examine these relationships. Consider, …rst, the log-linear pricing equations in the non-stochastic steady state. These are given by:
These equations state that, in the non-stochastic steady state, the value of capital (p 1 ) and of jobs (p 2 ) can each be decomposed (using log-linear approximation) into parts due to dividends (d) or shares in net productivity, returns (r), productivity growth (ln G f =k or ln G f =n ) and deprecation ( ) or separation ( ).
Thus I estimate the following restricted structural VAR:
where
; ln(1 t+1 )) for labor, under the restrictions implied by the steady state equations (24) and (25) . Following estimation I compute the relevant long run coe¢ cients (see Appendix D for a full derivation). Table 5 reports the results of the VAR for selected coe¢ cients in the B matrix and the implied long run coe¢ cients. Table 5 For investment, a substantial role is played by returns (a long run coef…cient of 1:15), while the other determinants have negligible e¤ects. Productivity growth seems to have some e¤ect but it is imprecisely estimated.
VAR Results
The adjusted R 2 of the return regression (that of r 1 on the lagged values of all the other variables) is not high, though at 0:23 it is higher than the value reported in the Finance literature for return regressions using stock prices.
For hiring, the most substantial role is again played by returns (a long run coe¢ cient of 0:73), and to some extent by labor pro…tability, i.e., produc- Note that these coe¢ cients are negative, implying that a rise in log prices is associated with future declines in returns (r), for both investment and hiring, i.e., high prices predict low subsequent returns, as found in the Finance literature. A similar result is obtained when computing the relation between the log price-dividend ratio (p d) of investment and of hiring with their subsequent returns. This result has also been observed for stock prices and dividends and for house prices and rents (see Cochrane (2011, pp. 1051-1052)).
Second,"dividends" in the way de…ned here -labor pro…tability -play a role in the hiring case, although a smaller one than returns. In this case, higher prices are associated with subsequent higher labor pro…tability and the adjusted R 2 is very high (0:95). Productivity does not play a signi…cant role in the capital case.
Third, productivity growth, does not appear to play a role in both cases: the VAR coe¢ cients (b gk_p1 and b gn_p2 ) are not signi…cantly di¤erent from zero. This is akin to the …nding in Finance that dividend growth does not matter much. This exercise uses the estimates of Table 2 to embed the vacancy and investment F.O.C. in a wider framework, albeit still a partial equilibrium one. By calibrating the parameters using the GMM estimates and employing data averages, the steady state of this framework is derived and compared to actual data using graphical analysis. This allows one to see how movements in the data over the sample period may be approximated by movements in the model's steady state curves over sub-periods. The changes in unemployment and vacancies over time can be understood in terms of changes in variables that are at the focus of the analysis -job and capital values. I then compare the results of the current model to those implied by the standard search and matching model.
Incorporating the Analysis in a Matching Framework
Following Pissarides (2000), a matching function de…nes the hiring rate:
There are two CRS functions for each of the hiring ‡ows:
where t is the fraction of employed workers that are searching for work in another …rm. As noted above, h 2 t = 2 t : The …rm matching rates are given by:
In the steady state the two FOC are given by:
In steady state equilibrium, the ‡ows from and to non-employment are equal so:
Within employment ‡ows satisfy:
where g is the rate of growth of the labor force (n + u).
The solution to (32) , (33), (34) 
which can be substituted into (33) . The steady state equilibrium can thus be presented as follows:
Substituting (39) into (37) 
Using (40), the vacancy creation curve, and (41), the steady state ‡ows curve, one solves for u n and v n given the steady state values of the variables Note that term "Beveridge curve" is often used to denote the empirical relationship between v and u (see Yashiv (2008) ). In the search and matching literature, this term is typically used to designate the steady state ‡ows equation, given here by (41).
Graphical Analysis
Figure 2 presents a plot of these curves in u n v n space, together with data points that will be described shortly.
Figure 2
The …gure depicts two downward-sloping curves:
a. The steady state ‡ows curve (41) is downward-sloping because as (42) and (41) in the standard model (Figure 3 ), to the actual data. The idea is to …nd a region in u n v n space where these equations are a reasonable approximation of the steady state around which the data points are scattered. This is a "stylized exercise" which needs to be understood as such.
In order to do so one needs to use the relevant unemployment pool u t .
The hiring series (h 1 t ) used here includes worker ‡ows to employment from both the out of the labor force pool and the o¢ cial unemployment pool. I examine three alternative formulations for u t : in one it is the o¢ cial unemployment pool; in a second, it is the o¢ cial unemployment pool plus marginally attached workers; and in a third it is the o¢ cial unemployment pool plus workers who "want a job."Using these variables, and a vacancy series, 1 5 Note, that it does not start at the origin because of the job to job ‡ow term 2 ( ) v n in (42). Table 6 presents average values of all relevant variables in these sub-periods using the o¢ cial unemployment pool. Appendix E does the same for the other two formulations of unemployment.
Table 6
The data points are fairly well distributed around the steady state curves.
By construction, the intersection of the curves lies at the relevant sub-sample average. It turns out that the analysis of the other two non-employment pools yields the same qualitative conclusions. Figure 2 and Table 6 , as well as the …gures and tables in Appendix E, suggest the following interpretation of U.S. labor market developments: in the Great Recession, both curves shifted up. The outcome was that the unemployment rate increased considerably while the vacancy rate fell somewhat. Table 6 ).
How do these same u n v n developments look in the standard search and matching model? Figure 3 features the data points in the same way, as does Appendix E for the other non-employment pools. In this standard model, job values Q N search go down, which can be seen in Table 6 . Therefore the vacancy creation curve underlying (42) moves down, implying lower vacancy creation for a given rate of unemployment. With the further move in the ‡ows curve (41), for the same reason as above, equilibrium moves to a higher rate of unemployment. The increase in the ‡ow into unemployment (higher 1 ) needs to be balanced by the out ‡ow from unemployment and vacancy rates rise too, though not as far as the initial rate.
Note, then, the di¤erence between the current model and the standard model in accounting for the same developments in the data: in the current model the job value has gone up (as well as the capital value) while in the standard model it has gone down. Both of these movements in job values may be seen in Figure 1 of Section 5.3 above. Hence, while both models can account for the developments in 16 So while the standard model has vacancy duration ( 1 q ) as the only element driving ‡uctuations in costs, the current model adds to this element also hiring and investment rates.
Note that the standard model is a special case of the current model (with e 1 = e 31 = e 32 = 0; 1 = 2 = 0 and 2 = 1) and in estimation has yielded parameter estimates indicating excessively high vacancy costs.
Conclusions
The key notions in this paper are the forward-looking aspect of investment and hiring and their joint determination. More speci…cally, the results indicate three sets of key implications:
One is the complementarity between hiring and investment and substantial cross-e¤ects -the …rst and second moments of the hiring rate are heavily in ‡uenced by the present value of investment and vice versa. Estimated job 1 6 As can be seen on the LHS of (40). Table 2a where it is 1976:1-2013:4. 1. Mean and std. refer to sample statistics.
2. The functions were computed using the point estimates in Tables 2   a,b. iv ).
4. All results are based on the point estimates of row 1 in Table 2a .
vi Notes: As in Figure 3 , except that the vacancy creation curve is given by equation (42).
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